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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
000O000

FRANK P. O'DONNELL,

)

Plaintiff/Appellant,

)

vs.

)

MARY A. O'DONNELL,
Defendant/Appellee.

)
)

Trial Court No. 884902181DA
Appeal Court No. 930300-CA

)
)

Priority No. 16

000O000

APPELLEE'S

BRIEF

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the District Court's Order denying
Plaintiff Frank P. O'Donnell's petition to modify a Divorce Decree
to

reduce

child

support

and

eliminate

both

alimony

and

his

obligation to pay his child's tuition for private school - as well
as pay $4,000.00 in attorney fees and costs to Defendant Mary A.
O'Donnell as partial payment of costs incurred in defending against
the Defendant's Petition.
The Decree of Divorce was entered on August 9, 1990, in
a bifurcated proceeding with the financial issues reserved until
February, 1991.

On February 28, 1991, the financial issues were

resolved

based

on

the

parties'

proffers,

court

rulings

and

stipulations. At that time, based upon representations made by the
Plaintiff of his income and ability to pay, the parties stipulated
to an award of $500.00 per month alimony and $500.00 per month
child support, with Plaintiff agreeing to pay the parties' minor
child's health insurance, private school tuition and registration
fees.

Defendant was to pay remaining private school expenses.

On

October 10, 1991, the court entered an Amended Supplemental Decree
of Divorce reflecting this agreement.
On October 3, 1991, Mr. O'Donnell filed a Petition to
Modify the Decree of Divorce seeking to terminate his alimony
obligation, reduce the child support payments and eliminate his
obligation to pay private school tuition and registration expenses.
After a trial of the issues on November 30, 1992, the
court in a December 4, 1992 Minute Entry ruling denied the Petition
to Modify the Divorce Decree, finding that there had been no
substantial change in Mr. O'Donnell's circumstances.

On April 1,

1993, the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

On May 11, 1993, the court made a further Minute Entry

awarding Defendant $4,000.00 in attorney fees and costs and on June
11, 1993 entered its implementing Order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant accepts the Statement of Facts as set out in
the Plaintiff's brief, with the following additions:
Plaintiff has failed to pay the support he agreed to pay
and the court ordered him to pay from shortly after the entry of
2

the Decree of Divorce.

This resulted in judgements for unpaid

support being entered against him as follows:
Entry Date of Judgement

AMOUNT

September 18, 1991 (R. 317)
(Medical Expenses)
$ 1,003.78
(Alimony - July & Aug.) $ 1,000.00

$2,003.78

October 10, 1991 (R. 360,
and R. 354)
Unpaid alimony
$14,136.00
for period of
Sept. 1990 to Oct., 1991

$6,000.00

February 2, 1992 (R. 433)
Alimony (9 - 12/1992)
$ 2,000.00
Child Support 11 -12/92) $ 1,000.00

$3,000.00

May 3, 1993 (R. 667)
Alimony
Child Support
Attorney's Fees

$9,740.00
$ 6,000.00
$ 3,390.00
$
350.00

June 11, 1993 (R.697)
Attorney's Fees for
defense of Petition
to Modify Divorce Decree

$4,000.00

TOTAL AMOUNT OF JUDGMENTS OUTSTANDING: $24,743.78
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
Plaintiff's

The trial court did not err in considering
present

wife's

current financial situation.

income

when

appraising

the

Plaintiff's

Courts may consider a new spouse's

income when determining the supporting spouse's ability to pay.
Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986), Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619
P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980) and Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (.Utah
App. 1992).
II.

The trial court did not err in citing Rasband v.

Rasband, 752 P. 2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988) , to conclude that the value
3

of company-paid travel, vehicle and entertainment expenses may be
weighed when calculating Plaintiff's overall income.

The court

rightfully included the personal benefit received by Plaintiff and
his wife, as well as the measure of control Plaintiff and his wife
exerted over the company's policies, procedures and records.

Muir

v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992)
III. The trial court's findings that Plaintiff's income
was difficult to establish and that Plaintiff failed to establish
his income were not in error, particularly in view of his status as
director, vice-president and stockholder of the company and his
current wife's status as bookkeeper

for the company.

Neither

Plaintiff nor his current wife were able to remember the amount of
additional benefits that had been paid.

Furthermore, after being

asked in discovery to produce the document that detailed some of
these expenses, neither Plaintiff nor his wife were able to explain
in court why it had not been produced.
that

the

income

circumstances.
IV.
awarding

was

difficult

The court rightfully found

to

determine

under

these

Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

$4,000.00

in

attorney

fees

to

Defendant,

given

the

significantly higher income level of Plaintiff, the difference in
standards of living enjoyed by Plaintiff and his current wife as
compared

with

continually

Defendant's

failed

to pay

and

the

fact

to Defendant

that

Plaintiff

the alimony and

had
child

support he had agreed to and had been ordered to pay in the Decree
of Divorce.
4

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSIDERING
PLAINTIFF'S WIFE'S INCOME WHEN DETERMINING
PLAINTIFF'S FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.
The Plaintiff's present wife's income may be considered

in determining that no substantial change of circumstances had
occurred. This rule was specifically articulated

in Paffel v.

Paf fel, 732 P. 2d 96 (Utah 1986) and was properly applied by the
trial court in the instant matter.

Plaintiff seeks to overturn

the trial court's holding that the new spouse's income may be
considered.

In order to accomplish this, Plaintiff must either

have this court reverse the Utah Supreme Court ruling in Paffel,
supra, or demonstrate that the trial court's finding was clearly
erroneous.

Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991) .

To establish that a finding is clearly erroneous, appellant must
first marshall all the evidence that supports the finding and then
demonstrate that, despite this evidence, the finding is so lacking
in support as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence." Id.
Plaintiff has not provided a basis for this court to disregard the
Supreme

Court

erroneous.

or

demonstrated

that

the

finding

is

clearly

He has instead referred only to the evidence that

supports the outcome he desires.

In fact, the evidence weighs

heavily against his position.
In Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P. 2d 1374 (Utah 1980) , the Utah
Supreme Court acknowledged that the trial court was not precluded
from evaluating the new spouse's income as part of "determining the
ability of one who does have the legal obligation [to pay child]
5

support."

619 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Utah 1980) . Then in Paffel, supra,

the court ruled specifically that the trial court should consider
the income of the new spouse in its determination of the financial
resources and condition of the payor spouse.

732 P.2d at 101-102.

This was declared to be a required consequence of the Kiesel,
supra, ruling.

732 P.2d at 102.

After Kiesel, the Utah legislature limited the ruling by
prohibiting the courts from considering a new spouse's income in
setting child support obligations.

Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d

818, 822 (Utah App. 1992) . Thus, while the income of a new spouse
may not be considered in determining the adjusted gross income for
child support purposes under U.C.A. § 78-45-7.4 of the Utah Code,
the

Kiesel

and

Paffel

rules

attorney's fees and costs.

remained

in

effect

for

alimony,

As this Court stated in Crockett:

Inasmuch as the legislature has not placed a similar
prohibition on considering a new spouse's income when
determining whether to award attorney fees and costs, the
discretionary arena within which the trial court must
make its decision is similar to that in place when the
supreme court made its ruling in Kiesel. We therefore
similarly hold that a trial court is not precluded as a
matter of law from considering the income of a receiving
parent's new spouse when determining the receiving
parent's "need" for costs and attorney fees.
836 P. 2d at 822.

The Court of Appeals clearly ruled that trial

courts continue -- post-legislative enactment --to have discretion
in considering the factors that constitute each party's financial
situation when considering the issues of alimony, attorney's fees
and costs.
The legislative intent of U.C.A. § 78-45-7.4 of the Utah
Code is not, by ignoring a stepparent's income, to disregard the
6

fact

that

one

financially

party

through

is

in

a

employment,

substantially
inheritance

better
or

position

remarriage.

According to the code, a trial court may consider the standard of
living and relative wealth of each party if the child support
guidelines are rebutted.
Code.
living

U.C.A. § 78-45-7(3) (a) , (b) of the Utah

Such a measurement of the parties' respective standards of
necessitates

a

contemplation

contributions to the living standard.

of

the

new

spouse's

U.C.A. § 78-45-7.4 of the

Utah Code merely prevents stepparents' income from being factored
into adjusted gross income for child support awards.
It is interesting to note that the legislature's intent
was not to prevent the stepparent from having any obligation to
support the stepchild.

U.C.A. § 78-45-4.1 of the Utah Code states

that "[a] stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same extent
that a natural or adoptive parent is required to support a child.
It was limited to delineating the resources applied in payment of
child support.

It would appear that the legislature's goal in

passing § 78-45-7.4 of the Utah Code was very narrow: to use only
the

income

of

the

child's

two parents

-- whether

natural

adoptive -- in the equation setting the child support award.

or
The

goal was not to prevent any consideration of the new spouse's
income in every matter having to do with the party's first family.
Plaintiff next argues that the facts of Paffel v. Paffel,
supra, are inapposite to those in the case at bar.

The thrust of

Paffel, upon which the Utah Supreme Court based its decision, was
that the supporting spouse's ability to pay is affected by the new
7

spouse's income.

The fact that the appellant in Paf fel did not

include his new wife's income while offsetting his income with her
expenses is not determinative to the trial court's use of Paf fel in
the instant case.

The substance of both cases is the same.

Both

courts were looking at the supporting spouse's financial situation,
a

factor

of

obligation.

which

is

the

new

spouse's

income

and

support

Whether the new spouse's expenses were included in the

calculations would merely mean a difference in numbers, not in
process.
In
statements

Paffel, part
regarding

the

of

the

court's

inclusion

of

discussion

expenses

included

without

the

concurrent inclusion of income inferred that the results presented
a skewed version of the husband's financial status.
101-102.
court

However, that was only a part of the discussion.

clearly

spouse's

732 P.2d at

ruled

it

is

appropriate

to

consider

a

The

present

income in determining the economic status of and the

ability to pay by an obligor.

732 P. 2d at 102.

In the instant

case, where the true incomes of both husband and new wife are
difficult to discern, the exact sum is not as significant as the
fact

that

it

is

-

even

at

the

minimum

cimount

claimed

significantly higher than Defendant's income and still well within
the range of Plaintiff's ability to pay the support ordered.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN VALUING THE
TRAVEL AND ENTERTAINMENT BENEFITS AVAILABLE TO
PLAINTIFF WHEN CONSIDERING HIS INCOME TO
DETERMINE
IF
A
SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE
IN
CIRCUMSTANCES HAD OCCURRED.

The trial court correctly considered the value of Plaintiff's
8

employer

provided

perquisite

benefits

to

determine

substantial change in circumstances had occurred.

that

no

Muir v. Muir,

841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah App. 1992); Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249,
1251 (Utah App. 1989), cert, dismissed,
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331

795 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1990).
(Utah App. 1988) .

In Muir,

supra, this court discussed this issue at great length, 841 P. 2d at
739 - 741 and the trial court's ruling effects those directions.
A trial court's decision concerning modification of a
divorce decree will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
Crouse, 817 P.2d at 838; Hacren v. Hagen, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah
App.

1991) (citing Myers v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979, 984

1989)).

(Utah App.

It is the burden of the party seeking modification to

demonstrate

that

there

has

been

a

substantial

circumstances that justifies modification.

change

in

Walton v. Walton, 814

P. 2d 619, 621 (Utah App. 1991) . Plaintiff was unable to demonstrate
such a change.

The trial court, relying in part on Rasband v.

Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988), concluded that travel and
entertainment

expenses

Plaintiff's income.

should

be

considered

in

determining

The trial court found that the Plaintiff's

business perquisites constituted a substantial benefit, requiring
an upward adjustment of his stated income.

After adjusting the

stated income to include the employment benefits, the trial court
found that there was no substantial change in the Plaintiff's
circumstances.
law.

These determinations are all correct in fact and

Muir v. Muir, supra.
The trial court did not err in citing Rasband to stand
9

for the concept that the value of perks and expense accounts should
be considered when determining Plaintiff's income.
Rasband

rightfully

gave value

to

these

The court in

additional

sources

revenue when considering the husband's ability to pay alimony.

of
The

valuation of perks is a well-established convention that occurs in
many areas of the law.

This was articulated in detail in the

recent decision of this court in Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 739-741.
It is common practice

for corporations

and businesses

to use

expense accounts and perks as a form of compensation, allowing tax
benefits to both employee and employer.

To say that such benefits

have no impact on the overall financial standing of an employee is
simply wrong, especially when the employee derives personal benefit
as Plaintiff did from the company car and the entertainment expense
account.

Thus, consideration of these corporation-paid expenses

was not error, particularly in view of Plaintiff's control over the
direction of the business as director, Vice-President, stockholder,
and major employee.
When an employee derives his income from a closely-held
corporation, benefits and expense accounts paid by the corporation
are commonly factored into the employee's total income in cases
like

the

case

compensation

at bar.

paid

to

manipulated by him.

Muir v. Muir,
an

employee

supra.

such

as

The

Plaintiff

corporate
may

be

Thus both individual income and corporate

income should be considered in determining the employee's financial
status, on an assumption that the employee benefitted personally
from

expenditures

of

the

business.
10

Trial

courts

have

the

discretion to consider several factors when evaluating a business
owner's income, see e.g., Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774, 777
(Utah 1992) (accounts receivables may be used to pay alimony) ;
Naylor v. Naylor,

700 P.2d

707, 709

(Utah 1985) (may consider

corporate benefits such as bonuses, pension contributions, and
profit-sharing accounts); Christiansen v. Christiansen, 667 P.2d
592, 594 (Utah 1983) (may consider both business owner's individual
income and the corporation's income in considering a petition by
the divorced wife for modification of alimony and child support);
English v. English, 565 P. 2d 409, 412

(Utah 1977) (may consider

business owner's historical earning ability to determine income).
The

court

in

Christiansen

found,

and

the Utah

Supreme

Court

affirmed, that the husband had benefitted more than his stated
corporate

salary

indicated,

including

personal

benefit

from

expenditures of the business for an employee benefit program and an
auto allowance.
Thus,

recognition

of

the

tangible

economic

benefit

provided by expense accounts and perks is well-established in Utah
law.

The trial court acted appropriately in application of this

law to this case.
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING
Plaintiffs INCOME DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH IN
VIEW OF PLAINTIFF'S AND PLAINTIFF'S WIFE'S
CONTROL OVER THE COMPANY AND THE COMPANY'S
RECORDS.
The trial court found that "[i]t is very difficult from
the records brought into court and the testimony of Plaintiff and
his wife, to determine precisely what is the Plaintiff's income."
11

(R. 638).

A trial court's findings will not be disturbed unless

they are clearly erroneous, that is, against the clear weight of
the evidence, or unless the appellate court reaches a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

Dunn v. Dunn, 802

P.2d 1314, 1317 (UtahApp. 1990).; Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings
of fact . . . shall not be set aside unless cleairly erroneous . .
.").

To

demonstrate

that

a

finding

of

fact

is

clearly

erroneous, Plaintiff must first marshall all the evidence that
supports

the

finding

and

then

demonstrate

that

despite

this

evidence the finding is so lacking in support as to be against the
clear weight of the evidence.
817 P. 2d at 838.

Crockett, 836 P.2d at 820/ Crouse,

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the

evidence is so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight
of the evidence.

In fact, after extensive testimony as to expenses

paid by the Plaintiff's company, the evidence clearly showed that
arriving
extremely

at

a

fixed

amount

difficult,

as

of

income

neither

for

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

(T.

would

70-86)

be
nor

Plaintiff's wife (T. 110)-- the company's bookkeeper -- was able to
remember the amounts in question.

Moreover, even after discovery

requests by Defendant, the detailed expense records that might have
provided the information were not produced by the Plaintiff (T. 8588) . Thus, while if Plaintiff had been more able to furnish exact
numbers,

the

trial

determinable, but

court
he

might

failed

have

to do

found

so and

Plaintiff's
the

court

income

properly

exercised its discretion in analyzing and applying that failure.
Second,

Plaintiff's

position
12

as

director

and

vice-

president of the company and his wife's position as bookkeeper led
the court to hold that establishing precisely what each receives
from the company is very difficult.

Several recent decisions have

explored this problem based upon analogous fact situations.

In

Muir v. Muir, the Utah Court of Appeals held that " [d]etermining
[the] Husband's income is complex because he derives his income
from a closely-held corporation."
1992).

841 P. 2d 736, 739

In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072

(Utah App.

(Utah 1985), the Utah

Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred in considering
only the husband's stated income, 700 P. 2d at 1076 (Utah 1985) and
ruled that the trial court should have considered that the husband
"had control over the entire profit, but chose to take only half of
it for personal income and to set the rest aside for reinvestment
in the business."

.Id.

As cataloged in Muir v. Muir, supra, this

court found that the extra benefits that certain companies provide
for their employees, including a company car or expense accounts,
tend to obscure the actual value of the benefits or compensation
received.

841 P.2d at 739 - 741.
The

ability

of

the

Plaintiff

to

determine

how

compensatory arrangements are set up was clear to the trial court;
particularly where he founded the company and his present spouse is
its bookkeeper.

Thus, the trial court's unwillingness to accept

Plaintiff's

estimations

of his

income

as

fact

is not

clearly

erroneous.

If Plaintiff wished to convince the trial court of a

substantial change in circumstances, he was obligated to meet the
burden of proof.

He failed to do so just as he has failed to
13

marshall the evidence in support of the judgment before this court.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID
AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S
DEFENDANT.

NOT ERR
FEES

IN
TO

A trial court has broad discretion in awarding costs and
attorney fees in divorce and modification proceedings pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989).

Crockett, 836 P.2d at 819, 821;

Crouse, 817 P. 2d at 840. The trial court must base its decision to
award attorney fees upon evidence of the financial need of the
receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the
reasonableness of the fees.

Crockett, 836 P. 2d at 821; Bell v.

Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1991).

Both the decision to

award attorney fees and the amount of such fees are within the
sound discretion of the trial court.

Crouse, 817 P. 2d at 840; Kerr

v. Kerr, 610 P. 2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980) . Where a trial court may
exercise broad discretion, the correctness of the court's decision
is presumed absent "manifest injustice or inequity that indicates
a clear abuse of . . . discretion.

Crockett, 836 P. 2d at 819-20

(quoting Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App. 1987)).
There is no evidence that the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the Defendant.

The

trial court found that Defendant made substantially less monthly
income than Plaintiff, demonstrating a need to have some of her
attorney's fees paid by Plaintiff. Moreover, the trial court found
that Defendant had not been paid amounts owed to her by Plaintiff
from earlier judgments against him for failure to pay the alimony
and child support ordered in the divorce decree. (R. 674) .
14

The

Plaintiff's failure to pay the support he agreed to pay and was
ordered to pay is clearly an exacerbating factor in Defendant's
inability to pay her own fees to defend the earlier divorce decree.
Even though the trial court found the Defendant in need
of assistance in paying her fees and costs and the fees she had
been charged to be reasonable, the Plaintiff was not ordered to pay
them

in full.

The court thus properly applied the governing

standards.
There is a second basis upon which the trial court should
be affirmed.

In situations such as this, where the Defendant is

forced into court to defend against attacks on orders in her favor,
the courts have found it entirely just to award attorney's fees
simply because they have been required to defend the action.

In

Lynale v. Lvncrle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah App. 1992), the court
held that where the wife was not seeking to obtain or modify a
divorce decree but to enforce the provisions of a decree

she

obtained in 1986, the trial court could award attorney's fees based
solely upon its discretion, regardless of financial need. Id.

The

obvious principle at work is that the Defendant should not be
forced to finance Plaintiff's attempt to avoid paying the ordered
support.
Neither should Defendant's attorney or firm be forced to
absorb

the

loss.

The

court

found

Plaintiff's

argument

that

Defendant had not yet been charged for her attorney's fees by her
attorney to be unpersuasive and beside the point, holding that she
did in fact owe them. (R. 674, 698). Plaintiff not only fails to
15

marshall the

evidence in support of this, he fails to show any

error in that determination.

Thus, Defendant is due her attorney's

fees and the trial court did not err in awarding them.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES
Defendant
attorney's

has

been

required

to

fees and costs in defending

incur

additional

this appeal.

She was

awarded fees by the trial court. This court should award Defendant
the costs
appeal.

and

attorney's

fees

she

incurred

in defending

this

Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 4 (Utah App. 1992).
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly determined to deny Plaintiff's

Petition to modify the Decree of Divorce.

He has failed to meet

the burden of proof required to overturn the trial court's rulings
before this court.

The trial court did not err in considering the

Plaintiff's new wife's income as part of the determination of
Plaintiff's
Supreme

financial

Court

have

circumstances.

found

that

a

This court and the Utah

new

spouse's

income

may

be

considered in determining the supporting spouse's ability to pay.
Nor did the trial court err in finding that the additional benefits
provided

by

determining

Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's

company
income

should

and

that

be

considered

when

the

income

both

of

Plaintiff and Plaintiff's wife was difficult to ascertain.
situations

like

this one,

in which

Plaintiff

has

In

substantial

control over the financial management of the company, all potential
sources of compensation should be considered and if the amounts
paid out are not well-defined, the trial court should exercise its
16

discretion against those who control the records and do not clearly
demonstrate the limits of their income.
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding Defendant her attorney's fees, given the disparate incomes
of Plaintiff and Defendant.
requests

this

court

to

Accordingly, Defendant respectfully

affirm

the

trial

court

and

to

award

Defendant the costs and attorney's fees she incurred in defending
this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

f

day of September, 1993.

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE

OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a member of and/or employed in the
law firm of COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. , 525 East First South,
Suite 500, P.O. Box 11008, Salt Lake City, Utah

84147-0008, and

that in said capacity, I caused four true and correct copies of the
foregoing

Defendant/Appellee's

Brief

to

be

delivered

person(s) named below:
Ellen Maycock
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

-,-tt
on this

T ~~ day of September, 1993

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
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to

the

EXHIBIT "A"

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Frank P. O'Donnell,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:
:
:
:

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO: 884902181 DA
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

Mary A. O'Donnell,
Defendant.
The Court having heard oral argument and taken testimony during the course of hearing
on the plaintiffs Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree to reduce alimony and child support and
now being fully advised in tne premises makes tftis its:
MINUTE ENTRY
The Petition is denied. The Court is of the opinion that the provable facts regarding
current income of the plaintiff are not substantially changed from the basis upon which the
agreement between the parties as to child support and alimony was reached at the time of the
original entry of the Divorce herein. Because the plaintiff is self employed or at least employed
in a company in which he and his wife are major employees, stock holders and record keepers
it is very difficult to establish precisely what each receives from said company. Nevertheless
it is apparent to the Court that if the tests in Paffel and Rasband are applied there has not been
such substantial change of material circumstance as to justify a modification at this time.

O'DONNELLV. O'DONNELL

PAGE 2.

Counsel for the defendant will prepare an appropriate order.
Dated this

y

day of December, 1992.

Richard H. Moffat If
District Court Judge

MINUTE ENTRY

O'DONNELL V. O'DONNELL

PAGE 3

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry,
postage prepaid, to the following on this

*/

day of December, 1992.

Ellen Maycock
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Attorney for Plaintiff
Eighth Floor, Valley tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
David S. Dolowitz
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorney for Defendant
P. O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
*2^,

U

,

EXHIBIT "B'

:*r,:rd Judicial District

APR - 1 1993

DAVID S. • DOLOWITZ (0899)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P. O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Defendant

•-'

fiiCCO'JNTY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOOOooo
FRANK P. O' DONNELL,

)
)

Plaintiff,

O R D E R

)

vs.

)

MARY A. O' DONNELL,

)

Defendant.

Civil No. 884902181DA
Judge:

Richard H. Moffat

)
oooOOOooo

The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial
on the Plaintiff s Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree and to
Reduce Alimony and Child Support and the Defendant' s Request for
Attorney7 s Fees incurred in defending the Plaintiff s Petition.
The Plaintiff was present in person represented by counsel, Ellen
Maycock.

The Defendant was present in person represented by

counsel, David S. Dolowitz.
testimony
introduced
advisement.

of

each

of

by them,
Having

the

The court heard and considered the
parties

and

then determined
considered

the

reviewed

the

exhibits

to take the matter under
evidence

presented,

the

arguments of counsel, and the governing law, the court issued its
Minute Entry Ruling on the 4th day of December, 1992.

Being thus

advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law,
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that:
1.

The Petition of the Plaintiff to Modify the Decree

of Divorce is denied.
2.

The Defendant shall submit her Affidavit regarding

attorney' s fees and unpaid alimony and child support so that the
court can determine whether or not the Defendant is entitled to
attorney' s fees and if so, in what amount based upon the economic
circumstances of the parties pursuant to the evidence introduce by
them at the trial in this jaatter.
DATED this J_

day of

'Dis t r i ct/ccni^bf Judge

2

APPROVED KSJSQ.
\\\
FORM *$^ ijmiikrs
THIS £l
day o f
March, 1993: /

ELLEN MAlTCOCK, Counsel
for P l a i n t i f f

iL/u<^^* Cot- Ky t^^te****^'
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, Counsel
for Defendant

£
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed this I f

day

of March, 1993, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to
the following individual:
Ms, Ellen Maycock
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Counsel for Plaintiff

(mb\dsd\0'Donnell.

Order)
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EXHIBIT "C"

'.\rz Judicial District

APR -1 1993

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P. 0. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Defendant

;'LTLAr:

IN THE THi;RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOOOooo
FRANK P. 0' DONNELL,

)
)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

)

Civil No. 884902181DA

MARY A. O' DONNELL,

)

Judge:

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Richard H. Moffat

)
oooOOOooo

The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial
on the Plaintiff s Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree and to
Reduce Alimony and Child Support and the Defendant' s Request for
Attorney' s Fees incurred in defending the Plaintiff s Petition.
The Plaintiff was present in person represented by counsel, Ellen
Maycock.

The Defendant was present in person represented by

counsel, David S. Dolowitz.
testimony
introduced
advisement.

of

each

of

by them,
Having

the

The court heard and considered the
parties

and

then determined
considered

the

reviewed

to take
evidence

the

exhibits

the matter under
presented,

the

arguments of counsel, and the governing law, the court issued its
Minute Entry Ruling on the 4th day of December, 1992.

Being thus

advised

in the premises,

the court now makes

and

enters

the

following as its,

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

At the time the parties were divorced, the court in

paragraph 5 of its Amended Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law
as entered on the 10th day of October, 1991/ determined that the
Plaintiff was employed throughout the marriage and has had the
following history of earnings:

In

Year

Company

Amount

1980

Kilborn, Ltd-

$ 39,203

1981

Kilborn, Ltd.

$ 43,508

1982

Kilborn, Ltd.

$ 57,800

1983

Kilborn, Ltd.

$ 49,200

1984

Kilborn, ltd.

$ 57,694

1985

Custom Equipment

$ 80,912

1986

Scotia Systems, Inc. $ 17,193

1987

Scotia Systems, Inc. $133, 391

1988

Scotia, Inc.

$115,653

1989

Scotia, Inc.

$161,000

1990, Plaintiff had W-2 income of $48,000.00 and

presently has income of $4,000. 00 per month.

The Defendant is

presently employed as a legal assistant and earns a gross income of
$1, 500. 00 per month.
2.

The Plaintiff testified that he is supposed to be

paid $4,000.00 per month by his employer Scotia Engineering.

2

3.

The Plaintiff is an officer and director of Scotia

Engineering.

He has remarried during since the entry of the Decree

of Divorce in this marriage.

His present wife keeps the books and

records for Scotia Engineering.
4.

At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce in

this matter, the Plaintiff was not being paid $4, 000. 00 per month,
but believed he would be able to continue to make that kind of
income from Scotia Engineering and in February of 1991 believed
that he could continue to make $4, 000. 00 per month.
5.

The Plaintiff s present wife, Susan, has a base

salary of $3,000.00 per month from Scotia Engineering.
6.

In addition to the Plaintiff s salary, he receives

a car, medical insurance and an entertainment allowance which he
uses for entertaining clients, but which also pays for his travel
and entertainment.
7.

It is difficult from the records brought into court

and the testimony of the Plaintiff and his wife, to determine
precisely what is the Plaintiff s present income.

The alimony and

child support awards that were set on February 28, 1991, were set
by agreement between the parties.

The Plaintiff knowing that

Scotia Engineering was having difficulty paying him, made the
determination to set child support and alimony at the levels set by
the court.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes
and enters the following,

3

CONCLUSIONS OF f.AW
1.

In determining if there is a change of circumstances

or determining whether or not the alimony paid by the Plaintiff to
the Defendant should be adjusted, the court considers not only the
income of the Plaintiff, but of his present spouse pursuant to the
decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Paffel v.
Paffel,, 732 P. 2d 96 (Utah, 1986).
2.

In determining the income of the Plaintiff, the

court considers not only the income which he has paid and for which
he receives a W-2 form, but it also must consider the value of the
perks and expenses that are paid for him, including travel and
entertainment, Rasband v. Rashand, 752 P. 2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988).
3.

Because Plaintiff is self-employed,

or at least

employed in a company in which he and his wife are major employees,
stockholders and record keepers, it is very difficult to establish
precisely what each receives from that company.
4.

The

burden

of

proof

in

establishing

that

a

substantial change of material circumstances has occurred which
requires

the

court to modify

the

Decree

Plaintiff, Bridenbauah v. Bridenbauqh.
1990).

of

Divorce, is

upon

786 P. 2d 241 (Utah App.

The Plaintiff has failed to meet this test in light of the

fact that he has not established clearly what he and his wife were
paid by the company by which they are employed and of which they
are

controlling

parties.

Plaintiff

has

not

established

material change in the earnings of the Defendant.
4

any

The Plaintiff

acknowledges that his earnings were uncertain at the time that he
entered into the Agreement in February, 1991 to pay alimony and
child support in the amounts ordered by the court and taking all of
these circumstances together, the Plaintiff has failed to establish
the change in circumstances required for a modification of the
Decree of Divorce that was entered in this matter based upon the
Stipulation agreement of the parties.
5.

The Defendant has requested that she be awarded

attorney' s fees for being required to defend this matter and that
judgment be entered against the Plaintiff for the unpaid alimony
and child support under the original Decree of Divorce.

She should

be directed to submit her Affidavit regarding the attorney1 s fees
so that the court can determine whether or not the Defendant is
entitled to attorney' s fees and if so, in what amount based upon
the economic circumstances of the parties pursuant to the evidence
introduced by them at the Atrial in thisr matter.

DATED this f ^3ay ofJS^hTl993.

•fil CHARD H/ mtiffiJS,
D i s t r i c t /Coviriu J u d g e
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APPROVED AS TO
FORM
THIS ^°\
day of
March, 1993:

ELLEN MAECOCK, Counsel
for Plaintiff

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, Counsel
for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed this

/ (day

of March, 1993, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following individual:
Ms. Ellen

Maycock

KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Counsel for Plaintiff

/mh\W^\n'nnnnd7 7

V^ITF 1
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EXHIBIT "D"

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Frank O'Donnell,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

:
:
:
:

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO: 884902181 DA
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

Mary Agnes O'Donnell,
Defendant.

:
:

The Court having considered the Objection to the Request for Attorney's Fees and having
heard oral argument thereon and now being fully advised in the premises makes this its:
MINUTE ENTRY
The Court feels the question as to whether or not the defendant will obligated to pay
attorney's fees by reason of the fact that she is employed by her attorney is not the proper
inquiry in this case. Obviously she is entitled to be awarded her attorney's fees if under all the
principles governing such matters she would normally be so entitled. The question of whether
or not her attorney by and through the generosity of himself and his firm is willing to absorb
the loss, if the defendant sustains one, should not be determinative as to whether or not the
defendant is entitled to those fees under the general principles. The Court is of the opinion that
in this case the defendant has demonstrated a need for some of her attorney's fees to be paid by
the plaintiff and that the plaintiff by reason of the fact that both he and his wife are employed
and are earning more money than the plaintiff regardless of what that amount might be and by
the reason of the fact that the defendant has not been paid the amounts to which she is entitled

ODONNELL V. ODONNELL

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY

under the orders of the Court all mitigate toward the award of some attorney's fees to the
defendant from the plaintiff. The Court is opinion that the plaintiff should pay $4,000.00 of the
defendant's attorney Is fees and costs.
Counsel for the defendant will prepare an appropriate order.

PAGE 3

ODONNELL V. ODONNELL

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry,
postage prepaid, to the following on this
Ellen Maycock
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Attorney for Plaintiff
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
David S. Dolowitz
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorney for Defendant
P. O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008

I(

day of May, 1993.

EXHIBIT "E"

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (08 99)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooO 0 Oooo
FRANK P. O'DONNELL,

)
)

Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

)

vs.

)

Civil No. 884902181DA

MARY A. O'DONNELL,

)

Judge:

Defendant.

Richard H. Moffat

)
oooOOOooo

Having
Conclusions

heretofore

of Law

entered

and Decree

its

Findings

of

Fact,

in the above-referenced

matter

rejecting the Plaintiff's Petition to Amend the Decree of Divorce
and having therein in paragraph 5 reserved the issue of attorney's
fees and having now had the opportunity to consider the Defendant's
request for attorney's fees, the court has determined from the
evidence presented that the Defendant is in need of assistance in
the payment of her attorney's fees; that she incurred attorney's
fees in the sum of $5,616.75; that the court has examined those
attorney's

fees and,

finding that both

the

Plaintiff

and his

present wife are employed, and that Plaintiff has actual earnings
and the obligation of support to him owed by his present wife while
the Defendant has lesser earnings and no additional support coming

to her, finds and concludes that the attorney's fees incurred by
Defendant are reasonable, the Plaintiff has the ability to assist
Defendant in payment of her attorney's fees amd the Plaintiff
should be ordered to pay to the Defendant attorney's fees in the
sum of $4,000.00 and that judgment should be entered against him
for that amount.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant and against the
Plaintiff for $4,000.00 as attorney's fees incurred in this matter
and the Plaintiff is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff the $4,000.00
in attorney's fees thus incurred.
DATED this

J

day of

, 1993.

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND
CONTENT:
ELLEN MAYCOCK, Counsel
for Plaintiff

-A^^ZJb

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, Coun
for Defendant

0CG98

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed this 2. I day
of May, 1993, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and
Judgment to the following individual:
Ms. Ellen Maycock
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Counsel for Plaintiff

(mb\dsd\0'Donnell.Fees)

^
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